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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
v. Reeside, 8 Wall. 302, 19 L. Ed. 391; Etting v. U. S. Bank, 11 Wheat. 59, 6 L.
Ed. 419; and other cases cited infra. Such decree of affirmance by a divided
court is as effectual as if all judges concurred; that is, an affirmance by an
equally divided court is conclusive upon the rights of the parties in that case.
Washington Bridge Co. v. Stewart, 3 How. 413, 11 L. Ed. 658; Durant v. Essex
Co., 7 Wall. 107; 19 L. Ed. 154, 101 U. S. 555, 25 L. Ed. 961. But according to
the great weight of authority such an affirmance has no value as a precedent
and is not to be regarded in the decision of future cases as in any way decisive
of the legal questions involved. Westhus v. Union Trust Co. of St. Louis, 168
F. 617, 94 C. C. A. 95; Kalamazoo v. Crawford, 154 Mich. 58, 117 N. W. 572, 16
Ann. Cas. 110; Hanifen v. Armitage, 117 F. 845; State v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224,
37 So. 51; Williams v. New York, P. & N. R. Co., 11 F. (2nd) 363, and many
other cases. But see contra, City of Florence v. Berry, 62 S. C. 469, 40 S. E.
871, and American Mortg. Co. v. Woodward, 83 S. C. 521, 65 S. E. 739.
R. L. A., '28.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-WHAT LAw GOvRNS.-Where an action arising in
Quebec on a notarial deed of sale and hypothec executed in Quebec was not
barred by limitation there but was barred by limitation in New York, action
thereon could not be brought against a resident of New York, under Civil
Practice Act, secs. 13, 55. Duggan v. Lubbin, 226 N. Y. S. 238 (1927).
In an action in New York by an heir to recover a remainder in personalty
alleged to have been wrongfully transferred by executors and testamentary trus-
tees of New Jersey decedent, New Jersey law of limitations is controlling under
Civil Practice Act, sec. 13, cause of action having apparently arisen in New
Jersey, defendants residing in New York, and plaintiff's residence not being
shown. Squier v. Houghton, 226 N. Y. S. 162 (1927).
Statutes of limitation are viewed in English and American law as pertaining
to the remedy. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312; Townsend v. Jemison, 9 How.
407; Bank of United States v. Donnally, 8 Pet. 361. Since such statutes affect
only the remedy, the law of the forum applies. Townsend v. Jemison, supra.
Accordingly an action could be brought any time before the remedy would be
barred by the statute of limitations of the forum even though the action was
barred in the state where the cause of action arose. This is equally true in
contract and tort actions. Townsend v. Jemison, supra. There is one notable
exception to the lex fori rule, and that is that where the statute of the state
where the cause of action arose extinguishes not only the remedy but the cause
of action itself, the lex loci applies. Hudson v. Bishop, 35 Fed. 820; Capps v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 111 S. E. 533. The two instant cases do not come
within this exception. If the common law rule were to be applied to the instant
cases, then the statutes of limitations of New York would undoubtedly govern
in both cases.
The common law rule has been modified to some extent by statutes in various
states which make the law of the state where the cause of action arises apply
if it is shorter than that provided by the law of the forum. New York has such
a statute in Civil Practice Act, Sec. 13.
This section does not incorporate the foreign statute of limitations into the
New York law, but merely enables the defendant to choose either the statute of
the state where the cause of action arose or the New York statute. Isenburg v.
Rainer, 145 App. Div. 256, 258, 13 N. Y. S. 27, 28 This is the leading New York
case on the subject, and is followed in the instant case of Duggan v. Lubbin.
Dalrymple v. Schwartz, 177 App. Div. 650, 164 N. Y. S. 496 is to the same effect.
The statute does not extend the period of limitation. Dodge v. Holbrook, 107
Misc. Rep. 259, 176 N. Y. S. 562.
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The facts in the two instant cases are very similar. The cause of action in
Duggan v. Lubbin arose in Quebec, a foreign country, while the cause of action
in Squier v. Houghton arose in New Jersey, a foreign state. The defendants
in both cases are residents of New York. It seems that both cases would fall
under Civil Practice Act Sec. 13, quoted above. In both cases the statutes of
New York would bar the actions, being shorter than the foreign limitations.
At least this is true in Duggan v. Lubbin, and we can assume it to be true in
Squier v. Houghton for otherwise there would be no reason for wanting to ap-
ply the New Jersey statute. The court in Duggan v. Lubbin held that the action
could not be maintained because it was barred by the New York statute. In this,
it followed the course laid down by previous courts in applying the statute in
question. The other case holds that the New Jersey law applies despite the
fact that the New York statute bars the action. This latter decision would ex-
tend the period in which action may be brought and is contrary to all the
authorities. R. B. S., '30.
MOTOR VEHICLES--FAMILY CAR DOcmrINE.-An action for injuries was
brought by a pedestrian who was struck while crossing the street by an auto-
mobile driven by an unemancipated minor returning from school. The issue
raised was whether the parent should be charged under the ruling known as the
"family car doctrine." Held, that the owner of the automobile was liable under
this doctrine for the negligence of his minor son on the theory that he was
using the automobile to go to and from school under his father's direction.
Mebas v. Werkmeister, 299 S. W. 601 (Mo. 1927).
The case is now before the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari since it is
in conflict with the opinon of the Supreme Court in Hays v. Hogan, 273 Mo. 1;
200 S. W. 286, which is considered the leading case on this subject in Missouri.
The court discussed Hays v. Hogan, saying that "though the 'family purpose
doctrine' is impliedly at least disapproved, yet the facts here do not come within
that case and are not controlled by the principle therein announced." The court
further distinguished the principal case from others by stating that here the son
was using the automobile in going to and from school under the direction of
the father.
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the laws of Illinois. Up to
the present the trend of decision in Missouri seemed to be directly opposite to
that in Illinois. During the many years that Illinois opposed the "family car
doctrine" Missouri followed it; and when Missouri repudiated this doctrine we
found Illinois taking it up.
In 1910, in the case of Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415; 133 S. W. 351,
the Kansas City Court of Appeals held a father liable for an injury caused by
his minor son who was driving the family car. Two years later in Marshall v.
Taylor, 168 Mo. App. 240, 153 S. W. 527, the same court apparently approved
the doctrine of Daily v. Maxwell. This case which involved facts of a similar
nature held that unless the parents could conclusively show that the son who
was operating the car was operating it without his consent, the father's consent
would be presumed.
Hays v. Hogan, supra, as decided in the appellate court followed Daily v. Max-
well and Marshall v. Taylor, but on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the
case holding that "the mere ownership of an automobile purchased by a father
for the use and pleasure of himself and family does not render him liable in
damages to third persons for injuries sustained through the negligence of his
minor son while operating the same on a public highway in furtherance of his
own business or pleasure and the fact that he had his father's special or general
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